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Security Model

Objective​

Define trust boundaries, core controls, and current implementation posture for Cyprob EE.

Trust Boundaries​

  • User boundary: authenticated users vs unauthenticated access.
  • Tenant boundary: organization-level data separation.
  • Execution boundary: scan checks run in worker code; WebAssembly plugins run in a wazero sandbox with a 128 MB memory cap and a timeout that stops a running call. On the appliance, the worker runs inside the server process.
  • Secret boundary: stored credentials (scan credentials, SMTP password) are encrypted with AES-256-GCM under a key that lives only on the appliance's disk (/var/lib/cyprob/secrets.key, mode 0600), never in the database or its backups. Passwords are write-only through the API.

Control Domains​

1. Authentication and Session Security​

  • Login and token issuance via POST /api/v1/auth/login.
  • Token refresh and logout endpoints are defined and versioned.
  • Session lifecycle controls are available (list/revoke sessions).

2. Authorization and Tenant Isolation​

  • Route model supports secure-by-default registration.
  • Org-scoped and permission-scoped endpoints are explicitly declared.
  • Organization context is enforced for org-scoped APIs.

3. Secret Management​

  • Stored secrets are encrypted with AES-256-GCM.
  • The key file is created by the appliance on first boot and is kept outside the database.
  • Secrets can be set or replaced through the API but are never returned by it.

4. Auditability​

  • Operational and security events are designed to be auditable.
  • Deployment and admin workflows should retain execution evidence.
  • Platform admins can read the audit log and export it as CSV to feed compliance and log-review processes.

5. Data Protection Posture​

  • Database and deployment model are structured for controlled access.
  • Multi-tenant operational model requires strict org-level access checks.
  • Backup/restore procedures must preserve confidentiality and integrity controls.

Current Implementation Notes (Important)​

  • Most checks are declarative YAML and HTTP/SSL templates; a few are WebAssembly modules.
  • WebAssembly plugins from the signed Cyprob feed run in an in-process wazero sandbox with a 128 MB memory cap and a timeout that stops a running call. Customer-written WebAssembly plugins are not supported.

Threat Assumptions​

  • Internal users may make configuration mistakes.
  • Restricted networks reduce but do not eliminate insider risk.
  • Compromised credentials remain a primary risk; short token TTL and session controls are mandatory.
  • Misconfigured integrations can bypass intended data-flow boundaries.

Security Baseline Checklist​

  • The console is served over plain HTTP on port 8080; a TLS-terminating proxy is in front of it for any access beyond a trusted management network.
  • Strong password and account policy enforced.
  • /var/lib/cyprob/secrets.key protected and included in backups; without it a restored database cannot decrypt stored credentials.
  • Org/role mappings reviewed before go-live.
  • Audit retention and review process defined.
  • Backup encryption and restore drill completed.

Limitations​

  • Security posture depends on deployment hardening discipline.
  • Compliance claims must be mapped to customer-specific controls and evidence.

Next Action​

Continue with POC Playbook to validate security and operational assumptions during evaluation.