Security Model
Objective
Define trust boundaries, core controls, and current implementation posture for Cyprob EE.
Trust Boundaries
- User boundary: authenticated users vs unauthenticated access.
- Tenant boundary: organization-level data separation.
- Execution boundary: scan checks run in worker code; WebAssembly plugins run in a wazero sandbox with a 128 MB memory cap and a timeout that stops a running call. On the appliance, the worker runs inside the server process.
- Secret boundary: stored credentials (scan credentials, SMTP password) are encrypted with AES-256-GCM under a key that lives only on the appliance's disk (
/var/lib/cyprob/secrets.key, mode 0600), never in the database or its backups. Passwords are write-only through the API.
Control Domains
1. Authentication and Session Security
- Login and token issuance via
POST /api/v1/auth/login. - Token refresh and logout endpoints are defined and versioned.
- Session lifecycle controls are available (list/revoke sessions).
2. Authorization and Tenant Isolation
- Route model supports secure-by-default registration.
- Org-scoped and permission-scoped endpoints are explicitly declared.
- Organization context is enforced for org-scoped APIs.
3. Secret Management
- Stored secrets are encrypted with AES-256-GCM.
- The key file is created by the appliance on first boot and is kept outside the database.
- Secrets can be set or replaced through the API but are never returned by it.
4. Auditability
- Operational and security events are designed to be auditable.
- Deployment and admin workflows should retain execution evidence.
- Platform admins can read the audit log and export it as CSV to feed compliance and log-review processes.
5. Data Protection Posture
- Database and deployment model are structured for controlled access.
- Multi-tenant operational model requires strict org-level access checks.
- Backup/restore procedures must preserve confidentiality and integrity controls.
Current Implementation Notes (Important)
- Most checks are declarative YAML and HTTP/SSL templates; a few are WebAssembly modules.
- WebAssembly plugins from the signed Cyprob feed run in an in-process wazero sandbox with a 128 MB memory cap and a timeout that stops a running call. Customer-written WebAssembly plugins are not supported.
Threat Assumptions
- Internal users may make configuration mistakes.
- Restricted networks reduce but do not eliminate insider risk.
- Compromised credentials remain a primary risk; short token TTL and session controls are mandatory.
- Misconfigured integrations can bypass intended data-flow boundaries.
Security Baseline Checklist
- The console is served over plain HTTP on port 8080; a TLS-terminating proxy is in front of it for any access beyond a trusted management network.
- Strong password and account policy enforced.
/var/lib/cyprob/secrets.keyprotected and included in backups; without it a restored database cannot decrypt stored credentials.- Org/role mappings reviewed before go-live.
- Audit retention and review process defined.
- Backup encryption and restore drill completed.
Limitations
- Security posture depends on deployment hardening discipline.
- Compliance claims must be mapped to customer-specific controls and evidence.
Next Action
Continue with POC Playbook to validate security and operational assumptions during evaluation.